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Three Approaches to Finitude in Belief Change Sven Ove Hansson (soh@kth.se) Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden Abstract. Since neither a human mind nor a computer can deal directly with infinite structures, well-behaved models of belief change should operate exclusively on belief states that have a finite representation. Three ways to achieve this without resorting to a finite langua

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/HanssonSvenove.pdf - 2025-12-23

Microsoft Word - Höög Manuscript.doc

Microsoft Word - Höög Manuscript.doc   1 The Philosophers on the Market Square. Philosophical Modernism from Vienna to Uppsala Victoria Höög Department of Philosophy, Lund University Victoria.Hoog@fil.lu.se  ABSTRACT: The logical empiricists in Vienna and their Swedish counterparts in Uppsala shared a scientific ethos that underlined the philosophical academics as representatives for universalism,

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/HoogVictoria.pdf - 2025-12-23

Authenticity and identity

Authenticity and identity 1 AUTHENTICITY, IDENTITY, AND FIDELITY TO SELF Sigurður Kristinsson Faculty of Law and Social Science, University of Akureyri sigkr@unak.is ABSTRACT: An ideal of authenticity is deeply imbedded in western culture. Following Harry Frankfurt, authenticity might be characterized as fidelity to the person’s essential nature. This suggestion fails, no matter whether personal i

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/KristinssonSigurdur.pdf - 2025-12-23

Completeness Theorems, Representation Theorems: What is the Difference

Completeness Theorems, Representation Theorems: What is the Difference Printed from: Homage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonssson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/HomageaWlodek Completeness Theorems, Representation Theorems: What’s the Difference? David Makinson Dept. of Philosophy, Logic & Scientific Method, London S

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MakinsonDavid.pdf - 2025-12-23

Infinite regress – virtue or vice

Infinite regress – virtue or vice Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?* Anna-Sofia Maurin Lund University Infinite regress arguments are interesting for several reasons. They feature prominently in the philosophic

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MaurinAnnaSofia.pdf - 2025-12-23

Introduction

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 INTENTIONALITY, KNOWLEDGE AND FORMAL OBJECTS Kevin Mulligan (Geneva) §1 Intentionality §2 Correctness Conditions vs. Satisfaction Conditions §3 Knowledge & Facts §4 Knowledge & Values §5 Knowledge v

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/MulliganKevin.pdf - 2025-12-23

Buck-Passing and the

Buck-Passing and the Buck-Passing and the Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction* Jonas Olson Brasenose College, University of Oxford jonas.olson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk Abstract. According to T.M. Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value, for something to be valuable is not for it to possess value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to tak

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/OlsonJonas.pdf - 2025-12-23

Primary and Secondary Reasons

Primary and Secondary Reasons PRIMARY AND SECONDARY REASONS Ingmar Persson Department of Philosophy, Gothenburg University Ingmar.Persson@phil.gu.se ABSTRACT:This paper argues that Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen are wrong in thinking that what they call the ‘Wrong Kind of Reasons’ problem presents a serious problem for the idea that the fact that there are reasons to have a pro-attitu

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PerssonIngmar.pdf - 2025-12-23

Microsoft Word - PeterssonBjorn.doc

Microsoft Word - PeterssonBjorn.doc COLLECTIVE OMISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY∗ Björn Petersson Department of Philosophy, Lund University bjorn.petersson@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: As Virginia Held, Larry May and Torbjörn Tännsjö have argued, it can be plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively, if this would be needed to prevent some harm. O

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf - 2025-12-23

Introduction

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 When to Defer to Majority Testimony — and When Not1 Philip Pettit Princeton University ppettit@princeton.edu The question illustrated How sensitive should you be to the testimony of others? You saw

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PettitPhilip.pdf - 2025-12-23

Introduction

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek Love, Value and Supervenience* Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen Department of Philosophy, Lund University Toni.Ronnow-Rasmussen@fil.lu.se There is increasing interest these days in a pattern of value analysis th

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/RonnowRasmussenToni.pdf - 2025-12-23

No title

This paper was written while the author was a fellow-in-residence at N.I.A.S. (Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study) Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek Fallbacks and push-ons Krister Segerberg September 22, 2006 1 Background Grove showed in eff

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/SegerbergKrister.pdf - 2025-12-23

Introduction

Introduction Printed from: Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson & D. Egonsson, 2007. www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek 1 Buck-Passing about Goodness John Skorupski University of St Andrews The 'buck-passing account' of goodness, as T. M. Scanlon dubbed it, is by now both familiar and much controverted. Saying that a t

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/SkorupskiJohn.pdf - 2025-12-23

C:\Documents and Settings\sobel\My Documents\D Drive\DataflsActive\Gd_Gld\Gd_Gld13forWlodek.wpd

C:\Documents and Settings\sobel\My Documents\D Drive\DataflsActive\Gd_Gld\Gd_Gld13forWlodek.wpd 1This is Chapter XI of Good and Gold: a Judgmental History of Metaethics from G. E. Moore through J. L. Mackie. Files for this work-in-perennial-progress, including a file of References for citations in chapters, are linked to a web page the URL of which is http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/%7Esobel/Gd_Gld. 2

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/SobelHoward.pdf - 2025-12-23

Papineau's diagnosis of the "intuition of distinctness"

Papineau's diagnosis of the "intuition of distinctness" IS THE MYSTERY AN ILLUSION? PAPINEAU ON THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS Pär Sundström Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå University Par.Sundstrom@philos.umu.se ABSTRACT: A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/SundstromPar.pdf - 2025-12-23

Infinite Lotteries, Uniform Probability, and Expected Utility (February 27, 1997)

Infinite Lotteries, Uniform Probability, and Expected Utility (February 27, 1997) Standard Decision Theory Corrected: Assessing Options When Probability is Infinitely and Uniformly Spread* Peter Vallentyne Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia Originally published in Synthese 122 (2000): 261-290. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted (with two small corrections) with per

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VallentynePeter.pdf - 2025-12-23

Justifying Rational Planning: on the indeterminacy of pragmatic considerations

Justifying Rational Planning: on the indeterminacy of pragmatic considerations Justifying Rational Choice: the role of success* Bruno Verbeek Leiden University, Netherlands §1 Introduction The theory of rational choice can be interpreted in several ways. One can regard the theory as a representing the choices of agents. The theory is interpreted as an empirical hypothesis for further research. Alt

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VerbeekBruno.pdf - 2025-12-23

Abril 2006

Abril 2006 1 SO YOU THINK YOU CAN TELL SENSE FROM NONSENSE, REAL DOUBTS FROM SCEPTICAL GAMES Stella Villarmea Universidad de Alcalá Abstract: In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in On Certainty and his distinct

https://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/VillarmeaStella.pdf - 2025-12-23